Part 5 was published only yesterday. It was about a ruling in one of the big civil cases facing ABA Centers of America, a ruling that allows Publix to continue forward with the RICO charges they have alleged. In that ruling, the Judge stated clearly that the case that sat in front of him could also be bought as criminal action. He also explicitly stated that “The Court has not been advised as to whether there is a concurrent criminal case pending.”
Today it became clear that the answer to the question of whether or not there is a concurrent criminal case pending, is yes. It has been building for more than two years and the documents that describe its trajectory are no longer sealed.
What follows is drawn from three documents, all of them public court records pulled directly from PACER, the federal courts’ public access system.
The first is a forty-six-page affidavit sworn on February 19, 2025, by a federal agent from the Office of Inspector General at the Department of Health and Human Services. It was submitted to a magistrate judge in the District of New Hampshire in support of a search warrant targeting the Microsoft email and OneDrive accounts of Christopher Barnett. That warrant was granted and Barnett’s accounts were searched. What the government found inside them was enough to request a second warrant 10 months later, on December 31, 2025.
That document is an eighty-one-page affidavit, sworn by the same agent and submitted to the same judge. Where the first warrant targeted one man’s email, this one targets twenty-five email accounts belonging to fourteen people: Barnett’s chief of staff, chief operating officer, chief clinical officer, chief billing officer, chief technical officer, director of admissions, director of utilization review, regional directors, the executive vice president, and an owner-level figure who received distributions from the companies. Where the first warrant’s probable cause was built on witness statements, this one is built on Barnett’s own emails, retrieved from the first warrant, quoted at length, showing him and his lieutenants discussing the fraud in their own words.
The third document is a much smaller, three-page order, signed the same day as the second affidavit, that prohibited Microsoft from telling any of those fourteen people that their email had been seized. The order expires on December 30, 2026 or thirty days after the investigation concludes, whichever comes first. However, the order to seal these documents expired at the end of July 2026.
All three documents were filed under seal in a magistrate’s docket in Concord, New Hampshire but they are now publicly available through PACER.
The First Warrant
On February 19, 2025, a special agent from the Office of Inspector General at the Department of Health and Human Services appeared before a Magistrate Judge with a forty-six-page affidavit. That affidavit laid out, in granular detail, a scheme of health care fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering spanning multiple states and several years. It asked the judge for permission to search the Microsoft email and OneDrive accounts of Christopher Barnett.
Barnett is the founder and former CEO of ABA Centers of America, the autism therapy company at the center of this series. The affidavit described him as the person who directed the fraudulent billing practices, received the proceeds, and spent them on the lifestyle this series has been documenting since Part 1.
The first warrant was granted. Barnett’s accounts were searched and what the government found inside them was enough to convince the government to ask for another warrant.
The Second Warrant
On December 31, 2025, the same agent brought an eighty-one page affidavit to the same judge, and asked for a warrant to search twenty-five email accounts belonging to fourteen people.
The fourteen are not strangers, they are the people who ran ABA Centers of America alongside Christopher Barnett. Michael Holzum Sr., his chief of staff. Michael Holzum Jr., his chief operating officer. Emily Santagati, his chief clinical officer. Quatiba Davis, his chief clinical officer of assessments. Barbara Kelly, his chief billing officer. Javier Cabrera, his chief technical officer. Eric Foust, the chief executive of Exact Billing Solutions. Shawn Westberg, his director of admissions. Sarah Glidden, an executive director who was caught altering treatment plans and was later promoted to vice president. Ed McDonough, his regional director of operations for the Northeast. And Nathaniel Irvine, the owner-level figure who received distributions from the companies through his entity, NTI Marketing. Two others are also among the fourteen but their names do not appear here.
The Six Charges
Both warrants target the same six federal offenses:
False statements in health care matters (18 U.S.C. § 1035) — making false statements in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care services.
Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) — using interstate wire communications to execute a scheme to defraud.
Health care fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347) — defrauding a health care benefit program.
Conspiracy to commit health care fraud and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349) — agreeing with others to commit the above.
Conspiracy to commit money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)) — agreeing to move criminal proceeds through financial transactions to conceal their source.
Transacting in criminal proceeds (18 U.S.C. § 1957) — engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity.
The first three describe how the money was taken while the last three describe how it was moved and how the agreement was structured. Together, they cover the full arc: the fraud itself, the agreement to commit it, and the laundering of what it produced.
The Patient Profit-Rating System
This series documented the broad shape of this system in Part 3, the tiered classification of patients by reimbursement rate, the proprietary electronic medical records system called ABA Connect, the offshore data infrastructure in Medellín, Colombia, and the consequences for families on the wrong side of the threshold. The affidavit confirms the structure and adds more detail that was not available until now.
The affidavit names the tool at the center of the system: the Census Tracker. It was built by the company’s chief technical officer, Javier Cabrera. In January 2022, he sent Barnett a preview of the Super Payor list, noting that he needed to add each patient’s “home office” and stating that he was going to make one more cosmetic change that would make the system easier to defend if anyone outside the company ever asked what it measured.
The affidavit also establishes who set the thresholds, it was Barnett. In one email, he directed that the definition of a “Super Payor” be changed to a 40 percent collection rate, a number he chose because it suited the business, not because it reflected anything clinical. The classifications were recalculated every three months based on claims data. Patients whose insurance reimbursed above the threshold stayed and patients below it did not.
The operational consequences were severe and they were deliberate, Super Payor patients were given priority for every authorized therapy hour. They were never discharged, even when they no longer needed services and when their assigned clinician was absent, staff was pulled from lower-paying patients to cover them. Scholarship Payor patients who could not accommodate all their authorized hours were discharged. Multiple clinicians who worked at the company described being instructed to cancel services for lower-paying patients in order to prioritize the higher-paying ones. One clinician told investigators that the company would do anything to keep the high-paying families happy, including having employees do the family’s dishes.
The affidavit also describes what ABA Connect did beyond sorting patients. Multiple witnesses described the system as the mechanism through which service units were up-coded, place-of-service codes were changed, and provider names and clinical notes were altered, all after the fact, in a system that existed outside the United States, with no audit trail visible to insurers, regulators, or families. The records could be modified and those modifications left no trace.
The Assessment Team
Part 3 of this series documented the broad architecture of the assessment pipeline, the separation between the clinician who assessed a child and the clinician who treated them, the de-skilling of the diagnostic process, and the treating BCBAs who had little to no control over the hours their patients were prescribed. The affidavit adds what Part 3 could not: who was on the team that did the prescribing, when it was created, and how its leader described her own contribution in writing.
In November 2022, ABA Centers of America created a separate assessment team. Its stated purpose was to conduct initial assessments and develop treatment plans but its actual purpose was to prescribe more therapy hours than the treating clinicians would have prescribed on their own. The team was led by a chief clinical officer, Emily Santagati, a BCBA based in Florida. Multiple clinicians told investigators that the team was created specifically because the treating clinicians “were not prescribing sufficient treatment hours.” It routinely prescribed thirty-five to forty hours per week regardless of clinical need, would copy and paste treatment goals from template banks and in some cases, listed the same goal multiple times in different formulations to justify the prescribed hours.
The leader of the assessment team, Quatiba Davis, also a BCBA, quantified her own contribution to the scheme in writing. In an April 2024 email to Barnett, she requested a salary increase to $325,000. In support of the request, she wrote that she had increased the treatment plan average, thereby contributing to a financial growth of approximately $38.3 million in 2023 and $24.2 million in 2024, a total of $62.4 million. She noted that this figure was based only on billing for assessment codes, and did not include the profits from the additional treatment hours her team prescribed.
She put her own contribution to the fraud in writing, attached it to a salary negotiation, and sent it to the man who directed the scheme.
Place-of-Service Fraud
The civil complaints from insurers both alleged that ABA Centers of America billed services at the wrong location, and the affidavit shows how it worked.
ABA Centers of America systematically billed services provided in Massachusetts as though they were provided in New Hampshire because New Hampshire insurance plans reimbursed at higher rates than Massachusetts plans. So the company maintained a geographic routing map. Patients in Worcester, Framingham, and Lowell were billed through Nashua, New Hampshire. Patients in Boston and north of Boston were billed through Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Patients south of Boston were billed through Salem, New Hampshire.
An email from the company’s director of admissions, Shawn Westberg, in September 2022 lays out the scheme in plain language. He wrote to the chief clinical officer, copying Barnett and others, that he had spoken with Barnett about “the office locations for our BCBS of MA kiddos” and that “we no longer want Salem to get any more of these clients, so we are going to split all of Massachusetts BCBS patients between only Nashua and Portsmouth.” He asked for a few minutes to go over “the map my team uses to redraw the boundary lines so we can get them assigned to the best office.”
Several clinicians described being assigned to the Salem, New Hampshire location on paper despite never having visited New Hampshire. One noted that the company did not even have an office in Salem at the time while another described being assigned to Salem while seeing every one of her clients in Massachusetts.
In one email, Barnett’s chief of staff, Michael Holzum Sr, sent Barnett an inventory of patients in the treatment-plan-submitted stage and noted that five clients were “in ‘Portsmouth’ MA BCBS” with no available BCBA. He put “Portsmouth” in quotation marks. The government interprets those quotation marks as an acknowledgment that the patients were not actually being treated in Portsmouth, New Hampshire but were being billed as if they were.
In a May 2023 email, Barnett asked his chief of staff why there had been a drop in Nashua billing. He assumed, he wrote, that “it was clients located in Massachusetts that were not paying great in NH, so we transferred them to Mass clinics when slots became available.” He said it the way someone describes moving inventory between warehouses. He was talking about children.
“GET THIS CLIENT PLEASE”
There is one email exchange in the affidavit that is harder to read than the others, it is about a child who was not appropriate for the company’s care.
A regional executive reported to Barnett and others that an assessment had been conducted and the clinical team had determined that a prospective client was “not appropriate for our care.” The child “was exhibiting self injurious behaviors (SIB) and we recommended a residential program.” The clinical recommendation was overruled by executives because the child’s insurance, he wrote, “paid 100% and this is a BCBS MA self-funded plan.”
Barnett’s response was four words: “GET THIS CLIENT PLEASE.”
The director of admissions then asked what “promises” he could make to the mother to secure the enrollment. The question he was asking was how to convince a mother to place her self-harming child in a program that the company’s own clinicians had already said was not appropriate because the insurance paid one hundred percent.
This is the email the government chose to quote potentially because it is the most revealing. It shows, in five words from the man who built the company, how the system actually worked; money always came before clinical recommendations.
De-Credentialing and Out-of-Network Billing
When ABA Centers of America hired board certified behavior analysts who were already credentialed as in-network providers with insurance companies, it required them to sign de-credentialing documents. The purpose was to bill at out-of-network rates, which are significantly higher than in-network rates. Multiple clinicians described being instructed to de-credential upon hiring.
The company also reassigned patients from in-network clinicians to out-of-network clinicians to maintain the higher billing rate. In a June 2022 email thread, Barnett directed that “every client” be moved off a specific in-network BCBA and onto a new one within forty-eight hours. The reason, as an Exact Billing employee explained, was that the in-network credential was causing claims to “adjudicate at a lower rate.” The patient’s care was not changing. The patient’s clinician was being swapped so that the company could bill more for the same service.
The Anonymous Fraud Tip
In August of 2023, someone submitted a twenty-eight-page fraud tip report to Point32 Health from an anonymous email address. The report described the Massachusetts-to-New-Hampshire billing redirect, the systematic over-prescription of therapy hours, the Super Payor categorization system, the bonus structure, and what it called Barnett’s money laundering through “a complex network of accounts across multiple banks” designed to make “the money’s true origin, purpose, and destination far more difficult to track.” It described a “$100,000-per-night private cruise” and Barnett’s attempt to acquire a private jet.
The Bonus System
Part 3 of this series described the general structure of bonuses tied to billable-hour targets, clinicians pressured to maximize hours, the incentive running through every layer of the company. The affidavit supplies the specific language and the specific rewards.
The affidavit describes a compensation structure that rewarded billing volume above all else. Employees who exceeded billable-hour thresholds were designated “high highs.” They received spot bonuses of $1,000 to $2,500, cash payments, luxury trips, and access to events including a Red Sox suite and a bonus dinner. One clinician received a $2,500 bonus and a Cartier pen from Barnett personally. Another was offered a boat charter to Miami to look at “extravagant houses” after breaking a record with sixty billable hours in a single week.
Employees who questioned the system were labeled “bottom feeders.” and were fired. One clinician who raised concerns about a treatment plan, saying that “kids need to be kids”, was told by Barnett’s chief of staff that that was “a stupid thing to say.” The confrontation, in December 2022, was described to investigators as aggressive.
The bonus structure and the assessment team and the Super Payor system are not separate mechanisms; they are the same mechanism, applied at different points in the pipeline. The Super Payor system sorts patients by profitability, the assessment team prescribed the hours, the bonus system rewarded the clinicians who delivered them, and the de-credentialing and SCA processes ensured that every hour was billed at the highest possible rate. The pipeline ran from the moment a patient was assessed to the moment the claim was submitted. It was designed to maximize reimbursement at every step. And it was designed by the fourteen people whose email the government now has.
The Dollar Figures
The billing-rate disparity, claims submitted at multiples of the in-network average, was a centerpiece of the civil complaints this series has covered since Part 1. The affidavit brings the numbers into focus at a scale the civil filings never reached.
The affidavit includes aggregate claims data from seven insurers covering the period from January 2022 to the present. ABA Centers of America billed approximately $1.56 billion and was paid approximately $370 million across those seven insurers. Across all of Barnett’s companies including entities in Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia, the total billed exceeded $2.4 billion, with reimbursements exceeding $480 million.
One insurer, Cigna, reported that ABA Centers of America billed $119.1 million and was paid $26.5 million. A Cigna investigator told agents that the company’s records lacked clinician identification and service unit documentation. Another insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, reported that its in-network rate for ABA services was approximately $30 per unit. ABA Centers of America’s rate was approximately $200 per unit, roughly 6.7 times the in-network rate. A BCBS Massachusetts clinical director told agents that the company was out of network, that it repeatedly requested single-case agreements despite BCBS Massachusetts not generally using SCAs, and that patients reported ABA Centers of America refusing to provide treatment when single-case agreements were not granted.
One parent told investigators that ABA Centers of America billed Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts $485,835 for approximately four months of services for his child. The insurer paid $482,618.76. The same parent said the company also billed Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Hampshire $1,038,315 and was paid $46,879. The discrepancy between what was billed and what was paid to the New Hampshire insurer is itself a footprint of the place-of-service scheme: the company was billing a New Hampshire insurer for services provided in Massachusetts, and the New Hampshire insurer was paying a fraction of what was billed.
They also said that an ABA Centers of America employee asked him how much he could afford to pay for a monthly co-pay. He said $25 a month, and that is what he was charged. This is the same structure the anonymous fraud report described: a one-dollar-per-month copay designed to create the appearance of collection while effectively waiving the patient’s share. Fee forgiveness is not a victimless accounting convenience. It is a fraud red flag because it eliminates the patient’s financial stake in the services being billed which means there is no natural check on whether the services were actually rendered, or whether they were rendered at the volume claimed.
Another parent told investigators that the company mischaracterized her child’s limitations to justify the prescribed hours. She said she was told, “We cannot accommodate that little amount of hours.” She said a camera caught an employee on the phone for an entire session and that ten to twelve clinicians came and went over the course of her child’s treatment, rotating through what she described as a revolving door “like McDonald’s employees.”
The Jet
This series identified the jet in Part 1 — a 2004 Bombardier BD-700-1A10 Global Express, registered with the FAA on November 20, 2024, under tail number N561RL, with Agile Equipment Leasing LLC in Wilmington, Delaware as the registered owner. The affidavit confirms that identification and fills in what the public records could not: what it cost, how it was furnished, and what the government now believes about where the money came from.
The purchase agreement was between Agile Enterprise Leasing LLC and Twenty X LLC. The price was $9,950,000. Barnett wrote about it in his own emails. He called it “a steal for south of $12MM.”
The affidavit also describes the interior, a meeting agenda for the plane’s furnishing included specifications that are worth listing in detail, because they describe a vision of luxury that is difficult to reconcile with a company whose primary business is providing therapy to autistic children:
Throw pillows. Blankets. China for twelve. Silverware from Hermès or Christofle. A Hermès travel chess set. Specific carpet with “no deviations allowed” and WiFi that “can be shut off at his request.” But blankets from Target for charter guests.
The distinction is the point. Hermès for Barnett. Target for the people paying for the charter. The affidavit notes that the plane was to be chartered when not in use by Barnett, generating revenue. The FAA registration, the purchase agreement, and the interior specifications together describe an asset purchased with company funds, registered to a leasing entity, furnished to a personal standard, and chartered for revenue when the owner was not aboard.
The affidavit also describes Barnett’s other spending, an approximately $20 million lease on a waterfront home in Fort Lauderdale. Two Ferraris — a 2022 SF90 Spider with a total sale price of $1,269,924 and a 2024 Roma with a total sale price of $483,495 — both financed through bank accounts the affidavit identifies as holding fraud proceeds. Ferrari returned records pursuant to a grand jury subpoena which means the government has already reached into the dealership and isn’t just reading emails, but pulling purchase orders.
The affidavit states that Barnett “used the ill-gotten proceeds from this fraudulent billing to make extravagant purchases to support a lavish lifestyle, such as luxury automobiles.” The purchases are not alleged to have been funded by salary they are alleged to have been funded by fraud.
The Money Moving
Part 4 mapped the Management Services Agreement structure — the 13.65 percent payroll markup, the management fees, Barnett’s contractual right to transfer money between company and affiliates up to a million dollars per transaction, and ICBD’s appointment as attorney-in-fact to take possession of all incoming payments. The affidavit shows what that structure was used for in practice.
It describes the movement of money between ICBD entities and the personal accounts of individual owners. In a September 2023 email, Barnett discussed “Agile’s ABA Holding’s distributions” and told Irvine that “you probably want your ICBD distros to go to your UBS account also.” The owner responded: “Approved.” In a July 2024 exchange, Barnett wrote: “Agile hereby votes to do a $700k ICBD tax distribution today. Does NTI agree?” The response came back: “Nti agrees.”
These emails are significant for the money laundering counts because they show funds moving from the corporate entities, the entities that received the insurance reimbursements, into personal accounts at UBS, a major Swiss bank. The structure is the one the anonymous fraud report described: a complex network of accounts across multiple banks, designed to make the money’s origin, purpose, and destination difficult to trace. The government now has the emails in which the owners approved the transfers.
What the Emails Show
The most significant feature of the second warrant’s affidavit is that it moves beyond witness memory to direct, written evidence. It relies on internal emails retrieved from Barnett’s Microsoft accounts during the first warrant, quoting him and his lieutenants discussing the operation in their own words.
In one exchange, Barnett emailed his chief clinical officer noting that while “the numbers look really good on your end,” the team needed to “push that number up.” The officer responded that she reviewed every treatment plan; if hours appeared low, she instructed clinical directors to justify them—or, if the justification was insufficient, to send clinicians back out to re-assess the patient “to see if the client requires a higher number of hours.” It is a candid description of a system designed to systematically override clinical judgment for financial gain.
Another email shows Barnett personally flagging a “new super payer” for an urgent audit. He questioned why only one hour of parent training had been prescribed, pressing for more: “Why not shoot for more?” This was not just administrative oversight; it was the company founder reviewing an individual patient’s treatment plan and pushing for increased hours solely because the insurance reimbursement was high.
Perhaps most telling is an email regarding a discharge summary. Barnett forwarded the summary to the assessment team leader, writing, “Something smells fishy here,” regarding a clinical team’s decision to discharge “a young child with great reimbursement rates.” He added: “It doesn’t make sense to discharge a good payer that needs our services.” It is the founder of an autism therapy company reducing a child to the status of a “good payer,” openly questioning a discharge decision based on financial bottom lines rather than clinical need.
The Nondisclosure Order
The three-page order that accompanied the warrant is a Section 2705(b) nondisclosure order. It prohibits Microsoft from notifying any person of the existence of the warrant or the order. It runs until December 30, 2026, or thirty days after the conclusion of the investigation, whichever is earlier.
The order lists all twenty-five target email accounts in its caption and is marked “Filed Under Seal”. A nondisclosure order in a provider-side email warrant is not unusual, it’s a standard tool used to prevent subjects from destroying evidence, coordinating stories, or fleeing once they learn their communications have been seized. The order binds Microsoft but it does not bind the press. These documents are public court records, obtained through PACER, and they are reportable.
What the nondisclosure order means, practically, is that as of this writing, the fourteen people whose email was seized should not have received notice from Microsoft. They should not know that the government has their sent folders and their inboxes and their OneDrive files and their Teams messages and their Bing Maps location history and their browsing data and their contacts and their calendars. They should not know that the government has the other side of every conversation they had with Christopher Barnett.
Some of them may read this article. If they do, they will know now.
What Happens Next
What happens next is not in these documents. The government will review the returns, build its case and determine what comes next. But what is clear is that this investigation has expanded from one account to twenty-five, from one man to fourteen, from probable cause based on witness statements to probable cause based on the subjects’ own words, captured in their own emails, retrieved from the first warrant and quoted back at them in the second.
The civil case is proceeding toward a jury and the criminal investigation is proceeding toward something the documents do not yet name. But the trajectory is unmistakable, the government is not investigating a billing dispute, it is investigating an enterprise.
This article is based on public court records obtained through PACER, including the affidavit in support of the search warrant in United States v. Microsoft Corporation, Case No. 1:25-mj-00267-AJ (D.N.H., filed December 31, 2025), and the accompanying Section 2705(b) nondisclosure order. All quotations from emails and witness statements are drawn from that affidavit. Individuals who are identified in the affidavit as cooperating witnesses, whistleblowers, or victims are not named in this article. The investigation is ongoing. No individual named in this article has been charged with a crime. All are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Anyone with further information or tips should reach out to abainvestigations@proton.me.

